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A BEGINNING AND NOT AN END IN ITSELF:




Congress has discovered risk assessment, and the new congressional
majority seems determined to make risk the centerpiece of its efforts to
rein in federal environmental regulation. The Republican majority is
responding to a barrage of criticism from industry that environmental
regulation is Draconian in its stringency and that its costs are out of all
proportion to its benefits. Unduly pessimistic risk assessments--bizarre
exposure scenarios, consistently conservative assumptions, and cumula-
tive conservatism-have been identified as aiding and abetting highly
protective regulation.' As a result, several bills have been introduced in
the 104th Congress to reform risk assessment as a means of moderating
the impact of the underlying environmental legislation.
The Democratically controlled 103d Congress considered several
bills to require additional use of risk assessment methodologies, but
except for a modest requirement in the Department of Agriculture Re-
organization Act, none was enacted.2 The Clinton administration also
developed a comprehensive set of principles for regulatory reform in
Executive Order No. 12,866, which requires a thorough analysis of
* James B. Helmer, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. This Article is an
expanded version of testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Energy and Natu-
ral Resources on March 6, 1995. I have been aided immensely in my thinking about these
issues, especially as they relate to environmental remediation at federal facilities, by discussions
with many individuals in advance of and in response to my testimony. Mark Schloneger pro-
vided invaluable research assistance for this Article, and my colleague, Brad Mank, provided
numerous helpful comments.
While I frequently draw on my experiences with the Department of Energy's remediation
of current and former Nuclear Weapons Complex sites (as chair of the Fernald Citizens Task
Force and as a member of the Department of Energy's Environmental Management Advisory
Board), the views that I express do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department
of Energy, the Fernald Citizens Task Force, or the Environmental Management Advisory
Board.
1. See, e.g., HARVARD CTR. FOR RISK ANALYSIS, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING
RISK ASSESSMENT (1992); HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP PROJECT, EXAGGERATING RISK:
How EPA's RISK ASSESSMENTS DISTORT THE FACTS AT SUPERFUND SITES THROUGHOUT
THE UNITED STATES 5 (1993); REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS PROJECT, INC., CHOICES IN
RISK ASSESSMENT: THE ROLE OF SCIENCE POLICY IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL RISK MANAGE-
MENT PROCESS (1994).
2. See Dalton G. Paxman, Congressional Risk Proposals, 6 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY &
ENV'T 165 (1995) (giving an overview of the risk bills in the 103d Congress).
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risk, cost, and benefit in conjunction with major regulatory actions.'
More recently, an interagency group in the White House Office of
Science and Technology Policy issued "Risk Principles" that adopt
flexible guidelines for risk assessment, management, communication,
and priority setting; thus far, only the Department of Energy has
adopted these principles in toto.4 The United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) has also issued new risk assessment guidance
with similar aims.
5
The risk assessment bills in the 104th Congress are legion.' Some,
such as House Bill 97 and Senate Bill 343,8 are wide-ranging regula-
tory reform efforts that seem deliberately designed to tie agencies in
knots by imposing an almost endless array of analytical and procedural
requirements, of which risk assessment is but one. Others, such as
House Bill 1022' and Senate Bill 333,10 are limited to risk assessment
3. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993). Executive Order No. 12,866
supersedes, but is built upon, Reagan's Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981),
and Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (1985). See Linda-Jo Schierow, Senator John-
ston's Proposals for Regulatory Reform: New Cost-Benefit-Risk Analysis Requirements for
EPA?, 6 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV'T 1 (1995) (comparing the risk bills with Executive
Order No. 12,866).
4. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 3, §§ 3(f), 6(a); DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,
RISK ASSESSMENT, MANAGEMENT, AND COMMUNICATION AND PRIORITY SETTING (1995)
[hereinafter RISK PRINCIPLES]. As they are not readily available elsewhere, the Risk Principles
are included as an Appendix to this Article.
5. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, POLICY FOR RISK CHARACTERIZATION AT THE
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (1995) [hereinafter EPA POLICY]; SCIENCY POL-
ICY COUNCIL, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDANCE FOR RISK CHARACTERIZATION
(1995); U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM FOR THE EPA POL-
ICY ON RISK CHARACTERIZATION (1995); Memorandum from Carol M. Browner, Administra-
tor, United States Environmental Protection Agency, to the Assistant Administrators, Associate
Administrators, Regional Administrators, General Counsel, and Inspector General, United
States Environmental Protection Agency (Mar. 21, 1995) (regarding the EPA risk characteriza-
tion program) (on file with the University of Cincinnati Law Review).
6. See generally S. 333, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 1022, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995); H.R. 9, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., tit. III (1995).
7. H.R. 9. House Bill 9 is one part of the Republican's "Contract with America." Title
III of the bill deals with risk assessment. Id. I discuss the version of title III that emerged from
the Commerce Committee mark-up and that was thereafter severed from House Bill 9 and
introduced as House Bill 1022.
8. S. 343, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Introduced by Senator Robert Dole, Senate
Bill 343, together with Amendment No. 229, is styled as an amendment to the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1988), and covers approximately the same territory as
House Bill 9. S. 343; Amend. No. 229, 104th Cong.,.lst Sess., 141 CONG. REC. 52068 (daily
ed. Feb. 2, 1995) (proposed by Sen. Dole and others).
9. H.R. 1022. As noted above, this bill originated as title III of House Bill 9, but was
severed to make its passage easier.
10. S. 333. Senate Bill 333 is limited in scope to risk assessment and the environmental
restoration activities of the Department of Energy. Id. § 4(a). It is modeled on legislation intro-
duced by Senator Johnston in the 103d Congress. Senators Murkowski and Lott also proposed
[Vol. 63
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and emphasize the careful use of limited resources. Taken together,
these bills have several common elements that are the focus of this
Article.11
All of the bills apply to two distinctly different agency functions:
standard setting under specific programs and priority setting across
programs. In the former, risk assessment is used to calibrate the
breadth and stringency of particular regulatory actions. For example,
risk assessment would be used to set acceptable emissions or clean-up
levels. In the latter, risk assessment would determine the availability of
resources and the sequence in which programs or actions would receive
them.
Part I of this Article raises the concern that the content and proce-
dural complexity of the mandated risk assessment process will result in
lengthy, expensive, and inconclusive administrative standard setting. At
the same time, none of the current proposals includes meaningful pub-
lic participation in standard setting, robbing such decisions of depth
and legitimacy. Part II argues that a purely risk-based system for set-
ting priorities will lead to poor and even perverse priority-setting deci-
sions. Risk is appropriately the starting point of much standard setting
and priority setting for health-based environmental regulation, but
other factors must have equal weight. Environmental problems affect
all of us, and in a democratic society, it is the business of public policy,
not of science, to decide how these problems should be handled. Part
III draws an analogy between standardized academic tests and risk
assessment, hoping to draw some lessons from testing's long-established
use of quantification. I conclude that standardized tests and risk assess-
ment, like all good heuristics, tell us much, but do not tell us every-
thing. In Part IV, I suggest that the real target of much of the risk
legislation is the underlying environmental legislation. Whatever its
value for other reasons, risk assessment is a poor way, and ultimately a
dishonest way, to effect changes in the fundamental structure of envi-
ronmental regulation. If reform of risk assessment practices is really
the goal, the Clinton administration's more flexible Risk Principles are
a better model for legislation.
Throughout this Article, I draw on my experiences with the envi-
ronmental remediation of a former nuclear weapons production facil-
Amendment No. 230, which would expand the application of Senate Bill 333 to all environ-
mental regulation and add a provision for judicial review. Amend. No. 230, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. §§ 622, 627, 141 CONG. REC. S2135, S2136-37 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1995) (proposed by Sen.
Murkowski and Sen. Lott).
11. For clarity of exposition, I ignore several less important differences among the provi-
sions of the various bills.
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ity, the Fernald Environmental Management Project, located in south-
western Ohio. Formerly the Feed Materials Production Center,
Fernald was a uranium processing plant, and it represents one of the
Department of Energy's major remedial efforts.1 2 In nearly four de-
cades of operation, the facility severely contaminated the soil and
groundwater on and adjacent to the site. The most recent estimate is
that Fernald released one million pounds of uranium into the environ-
ment.1" Fernald is currently in the process of clean-up in accordance
with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund), and it illustrates the effects of
the proposed risk legislation at an operational level.
Fernald also demonstrates the importance of public participation in
risk assessment and environmental decision-making. The Fernald Citi-
zens Task Force, which I chair, was established by the Department of
Energy in 1993 as a "site-specific advisory board,""' charged with pro-
viding recommendations on four central remediation issues: the future
use of the site, the degree of clean-up ("How clean is clean?"), waste
disposition, and clean-up priorities. The Task Force consists of a di-
verse group of interested citizens ("stakeholders") in the
area-residents, teachers, labor leaders, activists, health professionals,
and local government officials-and works with the Department of
Energy and its regulators, the EPA and the Ohio Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, to advise on these issues. By reaching consensus on
these difficult questions15 and by contributing to an atmosphere of in-
creasing openness and trust in the historically secretive and unaccount-
able nuclear weapons complex, the Task Force demonstrated that the
public and government officials can work together to arrive at sensible,
agreed upon solutions.
12. The six major sites are the Hanford Reservation, Washington; the Savannah River
Site, South Carolina; Rocky Flats, Colorado; Oak Ridge, Tennessee; the Idaho National Labo-
ratory, Idaho; and Fernald.
13. RADIOLOGIC ASSESSMENTS CORP., THE FERNALD DOSIMETRY RECONSTRUCTION
PROJECT, REP. No. CDC-5, at 39 (1993).
14. This term was coined by the EPA's Federal Facilities Environmental Restoration Dia-
logue Committee in a report recommending the establishment of such groups at federal facilities
to comment on budget and other clean-up issues. FEDERAL FACILITIES ENVTL. RESTORATION
DIALOGUE COMM., U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING
THE FEDERAL FACILITY ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION DECISION-MAKING AND PRIORITY-
SETTING PROCESS AND SETTING PRIORITIES IN THE EVENT OF FUNDING SHORTFALLS (1993)
(interim report).
15. FERNALD CITIZENS TASK FORCE, RECOMMENDATIONS ON REMEDIATION LEVELS,
WASTE DISPOSITION, PRIORITIES, AND FUTURE USE (1995) (on file with the University of
Cincinnati Law Review).
[Vol. 63
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I. RISK-BASED STANDARD SETTING
The standard-setting provisions of the risk bills have five basic com-
ponents. First, the applicability and content provisions require that
risk assessments accompany most rulemaking and other regulatory ac-
tions.16 The bills establish a detailed template for risk assessments to
follow, modeled on carcinogenic risk, 17 and they insist that the assess-
ments be "plausible" or "realistic" in the sense that all assumptions or
extrapolations must be the most likely or "central" ones, as opposed to
those that are extremely conservative or worst case.18 Second, the bills
seek "transparency" in risk assessment by ensuring that all methodolo-
gies, assumptions, and estimates are identified and clearly explained to
the user of the risk assessment. 9 The Clinton administration's Risk
Principles share the emphasis on transparency;20 however, the bills go
further and require that worst-case estimates be presented only in con-
junction with best-case estimates and that risks be communicated in the
context of other risks, both similar environmental risks and "everyday"
risks.21 Third, the bills impose a number of procedures for risk assess-
ment, the most important of which is mandatory peer review, a review
that in some cases can be the basis for requiring reassessment. 2 A
related requirement is a petition process for reopening any extant risk
assessment, to which the agency must formally respond in a limited
time period.2" Fourth, the bills provide for judicial review of risk as-
16. See S. 343 §§ 632, 634; Amend. No. 230, supra note 10, §§ 622, 628; S. 333 §§ 4(a),
6(a); H.R. 9 §§ 3013(b), 3201.
17. See S. 343 § 635; Amend. No. 230, supra note 10, § 625; S. 333 § 4(b); H.R. 9
§ 3104(b).
The model is drawn from the so-called "Red Book," the National Academy of Science's
basic statement of the methodology for carcinogen risk assessment. COMMITTEE ON THE INSTI-
TUTIONAL MEANS FOR ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO PUBLIC HEALTH, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS 105-
14 (1983) [hereinafter NAS RED BOOK].
18. See S. 343 §§ 631, 636; Amend. No. 230, supra note 10, § 623(3); S. 333 §§ 3, 4(b);
H.R. 9 §§ 3102, 3104(a)-(b), 3107(3).
19. See S. 343 § 636; Amend. No. 230, supra note 10, § 626; S. 333 § 4(c); H.R. 9
§ 3105.
20. Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 3, pts. B, D.
21. S. 343 § 636(3); S. 333 § 4(c)(3); H.R. 9 § 3105(3). Interestingly, a similar effort to
circumvent the use of worst-case scenarios occurred in the context of environmental impact
statements required by the National Environmental Policy Act, tit. I, § 102, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(C) (1988). The Reagan administration repealed the Council on Environmental Quality
regulation requiring the use of a worst-case scenario for many of the reasons that current risk
bills seek to require "central," as opposed to upper-bound, estimates. For a discussion on the
reasons for the repeal, see 51 Fed. Reg. 15,620-24 (1986). The idea of comparing other risks,
however, is new.
22. See Amend. No. 230, supra note 10, § 630; H.R. 1022 § 301; H.R. 9 §§ 3301-03.
23. See S. 333 § 5(b); H.R. 9 § 3401 (subject to judicial review).
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sessments to determine compliance with the legislation, either sepa-
rately or together with review of the regulatory action that they sup-
port.24 With respect to priority setting, the bills require agencies with
environmental responsibilities to set explicit priorities among the pro-
grams and activities within their jurisdictions based on risk and cost,
with the goal of achieving the greatest and most cost-effective risk re-
ductions.25 Fifth, the limited risk assessment bills purport not to re-
place the legal standards imposed by the underlying legislation,"6 but
House Bill 1022 and Senate Bill 343 add cost justification to. those
standards. 27
A. Avoiding Paralysis by Analysis
For all risk assessments, the bills adopt a model that was developed
for carcinogens and reported in the 1983 National Academy of Sci-
ences (NAS) "Red Book." 8 While this methodology is obviously inap-
propriate for certain kinds of environmental harm, carcinogens have, in
fact, dominated recent environmental regulation. In these statutes,
human health risk is the dominant regulatory consideration, and many
statutes adopt what can generically be called an "unreasonable risk"
standard-a nonzero level of risk that is determined on an ad hoc basis
by balancing health effects against other considerations such as availa-
ble technology and cost.30 For these statutes, few realistic alternatives
exist to using risk for environmental standard setting. 1 Consequently,
24. See S. 343 § 624; Amend. No. 230, supra note 10, § 628; H.R. 1022 § 401; H.R. 9
§ 3202.
25. See S. 343 § 639; S. 333 § 7(a)-(b); Amend. No. 230, supra note 10, § 629; H.R.
1022 § 601; H.R. 9 § 3501.
26. See S. 333 § 9(1); H.R. 9 § 3103(c).
27. See H.R. 1022 § 202(b).
28. See NAS RED BOOK, supra note 17, at 150-75; see also Howard Latin, Good Science,
Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89, 95-105 (1988) (evaluating
the EPA's carcinogen guidelines); Sheila Jasanoff, Relating Risk Assessment and Risk Manage-
ment: Complete Separation of the Two Processes Is a Misconception, EPA J., Jan.- Mar. 1993,
at 35 (critiquing the "Red Book").
29. The rise of human health concerns is traced in Samuel P. Hays, Three Decades of
Environmental Politics: The Historical Context, in GOVERNMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS 19-79 (Michael J. Lacey ed., 1989).
30. See John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory
Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 267-77 (1991) (describing the
"unreasonable risk" standard and identifying the relevant statutes). Even statutes that do not
adopt the "unreasonable risk" standard can be based on human health risk. See, e.g., Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
31. See Latin, supra note 28, at 95-105.
[Vol, 63
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risk is a sensible starting point for analysis.
The issue for standard setting, then, is not whether to use risk, but
rather the degree of analysis that should be required. The bills require
that a very substantial amount of data and analysis go into virtually all
risk assessments, without consideration of the significance of the risk at
issue, the amount of information that is readily obtainable, or the prac-
tical need for more information. I have noted elsewhere that the unrea-
sonable risk standard inherently demands large amounts of data, much
of which is unavailable."2 In fact, unreasonable risk encouraged the
development of the quantitative risk assessment methodology to accom-
modate these demands,"3 and the resultant scarcity of information
needs to be addressed, either by generating more or by requiring less
information.34 The risk assessment bills simply exacerbate the de-
mands of the unreasonable risk standard, however, by requiring ex-
haustive risk assessments in all cases. Given the paucity of good risk
data and the extremely high cost of obtaining it,"6 the bills commit the
government to lengthy and expensive regulatory analysis in virtually
all cases.
Even if the requisite information were ultimately obtainable, the
amount of data and analysis required should bear some relation to the
significance of the decision being made. 6 This is no more than a ques-
tion of the cost-effectiveness of the analytical process itself: additional
information should add value to-improve-the analysis. 7 Like the
diminishing marginal value of additional regulation, additional infor-
mation becomes costlier and less marginally valuable. 8 It is not only
32. Applegate, supra note 30, at 267-77.
33. Id. at 277.
34. See John S. Applegate, Worst Things First: Risk, Information, and Regulatory Struc-
ture in Toxic Substances Control, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 277, 309-28 (1992) (proposing a way to
require less information in order to address the scarcity of information in risk assessment).
35. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, TOXICITY TESTING: STRATEGIES TO DETER-
MINE NEEDS AND PRIORITIES 205 (1984); Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and
Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1796-
99 (1989); Milton C. Weinstein, Decision Making for Toxic Substances Control: Cost-Effective
Information Development for the Control of Environmental Carcinogens, 27 PUB. POL'Y 333,
333 (1979).
36, See Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 3, §§ 3(f), 6(a); RISK PRINCIPLES, supra note
4, at A.5; NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUB. ADMIN., SETTING PRIORITIES, GETTING RESULTS: A
NEw DIRECTION FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 60-61, 66-67 (1995)
[hereinafter NAPA].
37. The Risk Principles calibrate the amount of information with the significance of the
decision. RISK PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, at A.5. Executive Order No. 12,866, like its predeces-
sors, sets a threshold below which its analytical requirements do not apply. Exec. Order No.
12,866, supra note 3, §§ 3(f), 6(a).
38. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 35, at 207; COMMITTEE TO RE-
VIEW RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE DEP'T OF ENERGY'S ENVTL. REMEDIATION PROGRAM, NA-
19951 1649
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possible, but likely that exhaustive risk assessments will not be justified
in many cases. For example, removal (that is, temporary) actions to
reduce threats to health and the environment at Superfund sites would
not necessarily qualify as the emergencies that are exempted from
many of the bills.8 9 Nevertheless, removal actions by definition respond
to immediate hazards, and an elaborate risk analysis would add little
to the ultimate decision to act.
To put it bluntly, the risk assessment portion of the bills should
heed the advice of the priority-setting portions of the bills: resources
should be used in a cost-effective manner. It would be ironic if legisla-
tion designed to improve the management of scarce resources mandated
unwise use of those resources by demanding more analysis and less
action. Even if one thinks that environmental regulations are often
frivolous, there is no excuse for making them an expensive and time-
consuming frivolity. CERCLA decision-making, for example, already
takes too long and involves too many disputes, taking time and re-
sources away from actual remediation.4 ° The people who live near en-
vironmental restoration sites like Fernald are understandably tired of
seeing millions of dollars go into studies and analyses while on-the-
ground remediation waits.
The petition process envisioned in the legislation would have a simi-
larly inefficient effect. First, the ability to petition to revise already
completed risk assessments (and to obtain judicial review of denial of
such petitions) means that risk assessments would never be truly fin-
ished. More importantly, all regulation based on such risk assess-
TIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, BUILDING CONSENSUS THROUGH RISK ASSESSMENT AND
MANAGEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION PRO-
GRAM 32-33 (1994) [hereinafter BUILDING CONSENSUS]; Thomas 0. McGarity, Substantive
and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating
Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729, 736-40 (1979).
Moreover, instead of providing the intended regulatory relief to industry, it may well en-
courage additional information demands by agencies that need to comply with elaborate analyti-
cal requirements. To try to fix this problem, as House Bill 9 does, by limiting the information
that the agency can obtain is simply dishonest; one hand would require the agency to undertake
analysis, while the other would remove the information necessary to do so.
39. See, e.g., S. 333 § 4(a)(2) (stating that the "Act does not apply to risk assessments or
to risk characterizations performed with respect to . . . [a] situation that the Secretary deter-
mines to be an emergency"). An emergency is not required to trigger removal actions under
CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1995) (granting the President the authority to act when
there is a release or the threat of a release of a hazardous substance or pollutant into the
environment); 40 C.F.R. § 300.415(b) (1994).
40. See E. Donald Elliott, Environmental Law at a Crossroad, 20 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 1-21
(1992) (describing the long delays involved with Superfund cleanups and proposing solutions);
Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory Alternatives and
Legislative Reform, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 4-63 (1989) (analyzing the problems with OSHA's
output and recommending solutions).
[Vol. 63
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ments-in other words, virtually all environmental regulation-would
always be up for review at the behest of a petitioner. For regulations
of indefinite duration and at Superfund sites where work is expected to
continue for several years, the right to petition creates enormous op-
portunities for delaying enforcement and actual remediation, respec-
tively. Second, a petition process with deadlines for disposition distorts
an agency's priorities by enabling interested individuals to dictate
where administrative resources are directed. Once an individual files a
petition, the agency must divert resources in response, resulting in a
constant shifting of focus and loss of direction. Studies of the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Consumer
Product Safety Commission have documented this effect and have con-
cluded that their similar petition processes contribute to the agencies'
ineffectiveness.41 Again, the bills exacerbate the problem that they pur-
port to remedy.
Judicial review of risk assessments per se only makes the problem
worse. The constant threat of judicial oversight would further en-
courage the analytical overkill of the bills' mandatory procedures. Else-
where in environmental regulation, judicial review has frequently been
cited as a cause for the "ossification" of rulemaking,42 that is, it exag-
gerates the existing tendency of any bureaucracy to make what is prop-
erly an analytical tool into an expensive and time-consuming end in
itself.4" Agencies' fear of judicial reversal causes analysis to take on a
life of its own, pursued to the logical, but not the practical, end.44 Even
if courts were aware of the relative needs of big or complex deci-
sions-as compared to the needs of small or obvious ones-and under-
stood that, in some cases, information is simply absent, the bills would
give the courts little latitude. The elements of the risk assessment are
mandatory, and their quasi-procedural requirements are exactly what
one would expect a court to enforce strictly.45
41. See Richard A. Merrill, CPSC Regulation of Cancer Risks in Consumer Products:
1972-1981,67 VA. L. REV. 1261, 1363-64 (1981); Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 40, at 15-
18; Thomas R. Bartman, Note, Deciding What to Regulate: Priority-Setting at OSHA, 2 VA. J.
NAT. RESOURCES L. 87, 108-10 (1982).
42. See John S. Applegate, How to Save the National Priorities List from the D.C. Cir-
cuit-and Itself, 9 J. OF NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 211, 221-26 (1994); Thomas 0. Mc-
Garity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385-
86 (1992).
43. CERCLA's Hazard Ranking System for placing Superfund sites on the National Pri-
orities List exemplifies this problem. See Applegate, supra note 42, at 223-26.
44. Bernard D. Goldstein, If Risk Management Is Broke, Why Fix Risk Assessment?,
EPA J., Jan.-Mar. 1993, at 37.
45. Cf. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Assoc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 40-57
(1983) (finding that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration was required to ex-
1995] 1651
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B. Assuring Public Participation
For all of the analytical framework and procedures established by
the risk assessment bills, one procedure is almost entirely absent: the
active involvement of the general public in developing the mandated
risk assessments. This needs to be remedied. Members of the public
can contribute ideas, concerns, and even information that will make
risk assessments richer and more realistic. For example, the effects of a
health hazard on certain subpopulations, or the distribution of risk
throughout the population, may be far more apparent to lay citizens
who are directly affected than to risk assessors in Washington, D.C.
Similarly, citizens may have a degree of familiarity with an area or an
activity that regulators lack and that the regulated community may be
reluctant to address. More generally, the wisdom of obtaining a "sec-
ond opinion" from nonexperts-which is at the heart of judicial review
of agency action"'-acts as a hedge against the tunnel vision that can
easily limit an expert agency's perspective. 47 Ultimately, public partici-
pation strengthens even controversial decisions by stimulating broader
public understanding and acceptance."8 The mere incantation of exper-
tise has long been rejected as an adequate basis for agency action.4 9
plain why it rejected a mandatory airbag standard for motor vehicles); Thorpe v. Housing
Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 281-83 (1969) (enforcing the Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment's regulation requiring Housing Authority officials to inform tenants of the reasons for
evictions and to give the tenants an opportunity to respond).
A separate, but equally disturbing, effect of judicial review would be to encourage manipu-
lation of risk assessments to match management decisions. The Red Book sought to protect the
integrity of assessments by separating the objective, scientific analysis (assessment) from regula-
tory decisions (management). See NAS RED BOOK, supra note 17, at 49; William D. Ruckel-
shaus, Risk in a Free Society, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,190, 10,190-92 (1984). The courts have
already taken steps, albeit unintentionally, to break down this distinction. In Gulf South Insula-
tion v. United States Consumer Product Safety Commission, 701 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1983),
Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991), and Leather Industries, Inc. v.
EPA, 40 F.3d 392 (D.C. Cir. 1994), the courts essentially held the agency to the results of its
risk assessments, serving notice that the agency's management decisions must conform to the
results of its assessments. See Latin, supra note 28, at 131-32. The bills would have the same
effect. By mandating full risk assessments of all regulations and authorizing judicial review of
the risk assessments for "realism," and so forth, they would convert assessment findings into
management decisions.
46. See, e.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850-53 (D.C. Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
47. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (OR
How THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH-SULFUR
COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT) 13 (1981) (arguing that judicial
review influenced the way that policy makers perceived the ramifications of their decisions).
48. See generally BUILDING CONSENSUS, supra note 38, at 153-55 (recommending that
agency decisions should be publicly accessible). On the broader question of legitimacy of agency
action, see the sources collected in Applegate, supra note 30, at 289-304.
49. See Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Evaluating the Expertise of Experts, 6 RISK:
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Quantified, expert opinions of risk should be obtained and used, but
they alone should not be decisive. Value questions cannot be avoided
by claiming that risk assessments are simply scientific decisions.
The bills' petition process and judicial review are not equivalent to
public participation. They are designed for lawyers and consultants5"
to mobilize full-scale technical assaults on risk assessments. Petitions
and judicial review also necessarily extend the decision-making pro-
cess, because they must be tacked onto the end of the decision-making
process. In contrast, public participation is most useful at an early
stage when it is most likely to play a constructive role in decision-
making and before views have hardened into adversary positions. At its
best, public participation provides the occasion for dialogue and team-
work during the decision-making process.
A useful example can be drawn from the Fernald clean-up project.
Over the last several months, the Fernald Citizens Task Force has
made a number of risk decisions that are unusual, if not unprece-
dented, in consistently recommending a degree of clean-up less than
the maximum provided by law.51 The EPA interprets CERCLA to
authorize a post-remediation risk level (that is, the level at which the
risk is no longer unreasonable) of between 1 X 10.4 (1 in 10,000) and
1X10-6 (1 in 1,000,000) excess risk of cancer death. 2 Under these
standards, the Task Force could well have demanded the most rigorous
level for clean-up of contaminated soil around Fernald. After a thor-
ough investigation of the risk issues, however, the Task Force balanced
the risk to persons who would come into contact with the contaminated
soil against the severe disruption to the community that would be occa-
sioned by removal of the productive top layer of soil, and it adopted a
middle-ground clean-up target.
The Task Force's choice between protection and disruption was
clarified considerably by analyzing the risks and costs of remediation
and the risk calculations for exposure to uranium-contaminated soil.
Short-term disruption aside, it became clear that the highest level of
protection would require the excavation of vast quantities of relatively
"clean" soil. This choice would not only be expensive, but would also
necessitate disposal of the soil elsewhere and would entail construction
HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV'T 115 (1995). See generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1667, 1711-60 (1975) (recounting the transi-
tion from the expertise model to the public interest model of agency action).
50. The distinction between lawyers, consultants, and "the public" is not, of course, very
tidy. The practical distinction is between persons who participate as agents for others and are
usually paid for their time and persons who participate purely on their own account.
51. These conclusions are reflected in FERNALD CITIZENS TASK FORCE, supra note 15.
52. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a)(2)(i)(A)(2) (1994).
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risks to the remediation workers. Additionally, excavation posed the
risk of disturbing contamination that was otherwise fairly immobile.
Turning to the risk assessments, the exposure scenario for calculating
the risk from the undisturbed soil was the so-called "resident farmer,"
a person who lives on the soil, works it, and consumes produce grown
in it. The scenario is known colloquially as the "naked, dirt-eating
farmer," however, because the model also assumes full-body exposure
to the soil and incidental consumption of soil. Even though such indi-
viduals are a rarity in southwestern Ohio, the risk assessment was of
value to our deliberations precisely because its conservatism provided a
margin of safety for acceptance of a relatively higher level of residual
contamination.
The Task Force undertook a similar analysis in determining the
best way to handle contaminated soil and other debris from the clean-
up. Specifically, the question was whether an on-site disposal facility
should be used or whether the debris should be transported to more
arid locations in the western United States. Fernald is far from an
ideal place to store uranium-contaminated materials, because it lies
over a sole-source drinking water aquifer. Permanent storage at
Fernald entails an irreducible, though very small, risk of further con-
tamination of the aquifer. The Task Force balanced the risks of a dis-
posal facility against the transportation of large volumes of waste, con-
sidering the conservatism of the fate and transport models for the
contaminants. This analysis convinced the group to opt for a balanced
approach of shipping the highly contaminated, low-volume waste and
keeping on site the slightly contaminated, high-volume waste.
C. Transparency
The Fernald example suggests that what is needed in risk assess-
ment legislation is not pinpoint accuracy or elaborate procedures, but
rather clear exposition of what is known about the risks at is-
sue- "transparency." 58 Thus, the requirement in the bills that all as-
sumptions, models, and extrapolations be fully explained and that their
use be justified makes eminently good sense. Requiring such explana-
tions is a good way to ensure continuing attention by experts." ' More-
over, it guards against the systematic underestimation of risks by per-
53. See BUILDING CONSENSUS, supra note 38, at 24-30; RISK PRINCIPLES, supra note 4,
at B.3, D.2; EPA POLICY, supra note 5; Goldstein, supra note 44, at 37 (arguing that generic
risk assessment guidelines, combining both science and policy, should be established).
54. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850-53 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(discussing judicial review of agency decisions), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
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sons familiar with an activity.5" Thus, it is also the foundation of
public participation: without full understanding, it is difficult or im-
possible for citizens to make meaningful comments.
The bills go beyond transparency, however, in requiring "best esti-
mates" and "realistic" or "central" assumptions. Assumptions and esti-
mates are, of course, of critical importance to the entire enterprise be-
cause of the great uncertainty that surrounds risk assessments,
especially those involving carcinogens. The sources of uncertainty are
legion, and the results of risk assessments usually depend on the way
that the uncertainties are resolved. The bills are correct to recognize
uncertainty as a central issue in risk assessment, and there is, in truth,
little reason not to move away from extreme or counterfactual
scenarios. 56
Two caveats are in order, however. First, scientific certainty cannot
be legislated.5" Congress cannot create definite answers simply by re-
quiring risk assessors to use, for example, the "central" or most "real-
istic" value in a range of possible values. The central value is not nec-
essarily the "right" or even the most probable one. Likewise, currently
"realistic" scenarios do not necessarily account for future exposure sce-
narios, and typical or representative scenarios do not account for those
individuals who are exposed at atypical levels. Unless we are prepared
to ignore future users of a contaminated site or highly exposed individ-
uals, it would be a mistake to rule out scenarios and assumptions sim-
ply because they do not reflect current conditions.
Oddly, the bills themselves contain provisions for expressing risk as
a range of values, presumably because their authors recognize that in
many cases there is no one "objective" scenario. This contradicts the
idea of demanding a single "realistic" number, but it is the more sensi-
ble approach and more consistent with the goal of transparency. A
range or even a noncentral value can be thoroughly explained in a risk
assessment, leaving the user of the risk assessment with a fuller under-
standing of the issues and in a better position to make judgments. In
this way, risk assessments can truly focus and inform public
discussion.58
55. WILLIAM LEISS & CHRISTINA CHOCIOLKO, RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY 256-59
(1994).
56. For example, the D.C. Circuit recently overturned an EPA regulation based on a risk
assessment that assumed that a child was living on a highway median strip for five years, eating
soil the entire time. Leather Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 40 F.3d 392, 404-05 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
57. See LEISS & CHOCIOLKO, supra note 55, at 140-44 (criticizing as unrealistic the ideal-
ization of science as a policy tool separate from values and socio-economic context).
58. See Arlene Yang, Student Article, Standards and Uncertainty in Risk Assessment, 3
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 523 (1995) (arguing that guidelines should focus the uncertainty and policy
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Second, there is nothing inherently wrong with choosing conserva-
tive or protective scenarios or assumptions. After all, environmental
legislation has at its heart the prevention of harm before it occurs. This
certainly implies erring on the side of safety when uncertainty exists.59
If an estimate turns out to be erroneous, surely we would rather be in
the position of relaxing unneeded restrictions than apologizing to vic-
tims' families. In any event, as the Fernald example demonstrates,
even an extremely conservative risk assessment, if fully explained, can
be used intelligently.
In sum, transparency is essential to good risk assessment and risk
communication, but it must go beyond one-way communication from
technical risk assessors and decision-makers, with the meaningful input
limited to regulated entities, their risk assessors, and their lawyers.
This is no easy task, as a growing literature on risk communication
documents.60 Transparency requirements are the necessary foundation
for two-way communication between government and the public it
serves."1 Risk assessment should not simply be ammunition for oppo-
nents of regulation; rather, it should encourage better understanding of
all of the true costs and benefits of environmental protection.
II. RISK-BASED PRIORITY SETTING
The government does not have the information or resources needed
to move forward simultaneously against all of the environmental
threats that legislation targets. Consequently, action on some items
must be deferred or limited in scope. 2 The actual gap between re-
sources and problems may be smaller than many imagine,"3 and there
debate surrounding risk issues, not attempt to resolve them).
59. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 13-28 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (finding that
Congress intended a Clean Air Act provision to be precautionary in nature and, thus, not to
require proof of actual harm before regulating), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); see also
Adam Finkel, A Second Opinion on an Environmental Misdiagnosis: The Risky Prescriptions
of Breaking the Vicious Circle, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 295 (1995) (discussing Stephen Breyer's
Breaking the Vicious Circle and arguing that a "better safe than sorry" policy is best).
60. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REG-
ULATION 33-39 (1993) (expressing skepticism regarding risk communication).
61. RISK PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, at D.1 (stating that "[r]isk communication should
involve the open, two-way exchange of information between professionals, including policymak-
ers and 'experts' in relevant disciplines, and the public").
62. See generally Applegate, supra note 34, at 304-28 (proposing that the EPA should
restructure its regulatory scheme to emphasize more thoughtful priority setting because of the
scarcity of information and resources).
63. See CALIFORNIA COMPARATIVE RISK PROJECT, TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURY:
PLANNING FOR THE PROTECTION OF CALIFORNIA'S ENVIRONMENT 41-43 (1994) (summary
report) (recommending that policy makers fully and explicitly analyze the economic trade-offs of
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are many useful steps that we can take to narrow this gap. For exam-
ple, cause-based regulation,64 questioning the necessity of certain goods
and activities,6 5 and better information development66 would all im-
prove the ratio of resources to problems.67 Nevertheless, the problem of
scarcity remains. Given the stakes involved, purely subjective or intui-
tive risk evaluations are inappropriate. 8 An agency that lacks a delib-
erate planning and priority-setting process will simply respond to the
crisis du jour6 9 and will drift, squander its resources, and ultimately
accomplish little. 0
Considered priority setting, therefore, is both inevitable and desira-
ble. The difficulty is in choosing the criteria to use. To set priorities in
other than an ad hoc fashion requires some common measure or set of
measures. (Ultimately, of course, priorities are expressed in the com-
mon measure of budget dollars.) Risk suggests itself as such a measure,
both because of its intrinsic importance to environmental issues and
because of its legal importance in the relevant statutes."1 Accordingly,
decision-making); Jonathan Bender, Societal Risk Reduction: Promise and Pitfalls, 3 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. LJ. 255, 265-83 (1995); David Durenberger, A Dissenting Voice, EPA J., Mar.-Apr.
1991, at 49, 51 (rejecting the assumption that society must rank risks because it has limited
resources to address environmental problems); Mary O'Brien, A Proposal to Address, Rather
Than Rank, Environmental Problems, in WORST THINGS FIRST? THE DEBATE OVER RISK-
BASED NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES 87, 101-02 (Adam M. Finkel & Dominic
Golding eds., 1994); Michael McCloskey, Remarks at the Conference on Environmental Risk
Assessment, Politics, and Policymaking 9 (Nov. 3, 1994) [hereinafter McCloskey Speech] (tran-
script on file with author) (arguing that the assumption that regulatory resources are limited is
less compelling than it appears).
64. See Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Para-
digms and Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 371-76, 388-405
(1993) (arguing that policymakers should examine the causes of environmental problems rather
than treating their effects with various risk-based solutions).
65. O'Brien, supra note 63, at 99-100.
66. See Lyndon, supra note 35, at 1835-61 (suggesting that toxicity data collection and
management should be administered by principles that will promote a national data system).
67. See O'Brien, supra note 63, at 102.
68. LEISS & CHOCIOLKO, supra note 55, at 20-21; Frank B. Cross, The Public Role in
Risk Control, 24 ENVTL. L. 887, 928-49 (1994) (identifying the specific dangers of nontechnical
priority setting).
69. Merrill, supra note 41, at 1363-64 (contending that the attention given to petitions
distorts the Consumer Product Safety Commission's judgments); Shapiro & McGarity, supra
note 40, at 18-20 (asserting that OSHA needs a formal priority-setting process or else it will
always be subject to the priorities of others); Bartman, supra note 41, at 118.
70. See Richard N.L. Andrews, Long-Range Planning in Environmental and Health Reg-
ulatory Agencies, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 515, 532 (1993); Applegate, supra note 34, at 283-89
(contending that, because of the scarcity of resources, the EPA must carefully determine priority
setting); NAPA, supra note 36, at 121-22, 158-62 (focusing on internal management concerns).
71. See Should We Set Priorities Based on Risk Analysis?, EPA J., Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 18
(section by Daniel P. Moynihan) (asserting that prioritizing environmental problems is "com-
mon sense"); id. at 20 (section by J. Roy Rowland) (asserting that "risk assessment is more
than a useful tool; it is unavoidable").
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the proposed risk legislation provides that human health risk, in con-
nection with cost, shall be the basis for allocating resources. That is,
the agency is expected to maximize risk reduction by choosing the most
cost-effective ways to reduce risk.
The use of risk in setting regulatory priorities has, as one would
expect, many of the same weaknesses that it does for setting standards.
To some, using risk to make judgments across numerous pro-
grams-that is, comparing risks-simply magnifies those weaknesses
and renders it entirely inappropriate for such use. I disagree. Even if
the gaps and weaknesses in risk assessment suggest that it is disturb-
ingly imprecise for standard setting, it can still be useful for setting
priorities, which need not require a high degree of accuracy7 2 Risk
analysis is useful for organizing relevant information, 3 and it is a good
place to begin when comparing programs and activities. However, for
two broad reasons, risk analysis must be used in conjunction with
other considerations: risk has severe limitations as a common measure,
and other factors are equally important.
A. Risk and Its Limitations
Risk is an imperfect expression of the degree of concern that should
attach to a particular environmental problem. As an initial matter, the
basic data needed to perform risk evaluations of chemicals, activities,
and sites are severely limited, and the uncertainties in the extant data
are profound.7 4 For example, when ranges of possible values are taken
into account, risk rankings can even be reversed.75 It may be possible
72. See Applegate, supra note 42, at 233-34; Applegate, supra note 34, at 324-28. OSHA
and the EPA originally consigned quantitative risk assessment only for priority setting, because
it was insufficiently accurate for standard setting. Id. at 326. It was not the agencies, but the
Supreme Court, see Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst. (Benzene),
448 U.S. 607 (1980), that made quantification part of standard setting. See Applegate, supra
note 30, at 283.
73. See CALIFORNIA COMPARATIVE RISK PROJECT, supra note 63, at 22-23 (breaking
risks into high, medium, and low categories); Jasanoff, supra note 28, at 37 ("Risk assessment
does indeed offer a principled way of organizing what we know about the world. .. "); NAPA,
supra note 36, at 58.
74. Finkel, supra note 59, at 295; see also NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note
35, at 205-208; id. at 205 ("The information available . . . is scanty, and the resources . . . do
not suffice to test all chemicals for every possible health effect."); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, COMPLEX CLEANUP: THE ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
PRODUCTION 62-64 (1991) (asserting that credible data needed for evaluation has not been
attained); McCloskey Speech, supra note 63, at 1-2 (stating that substantial gaps exist in the
data necessary to apply the methodology to noncarcinogens); Shapiro & McGarity, supra note
40, at 5.
75. Adam M. Finkel, Some Small Steps for Congress, Some Giant
Leaps-Backwards-for Risk Assessment?: Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Environ-
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to make better use of data or to make more realistic assumptions to
cover the uncertainties, but the gaps and uncertainties remain and can-
not be eliminated by legislation.71 Similarly, estimating long-term risks
is so difficult that the results are necessarily highly subjective."
Furthermore, risk has many meanings, and disaggregating them is
crucial.7 ' Even within the purview of human health, there are many
possible endpoints. Risk assessment today focuses on cancer deaths and
sometimes on teratogenicity, but many other injuries occur-noncancer
deaths, cancer that does not directly cause death, breathing difficulties,
and others ad infinitum. 79 Also, occupationally encountered risks may
well be viewed differently from others, partly because workers volunta-
rily encounter such risks in return for wages.80 Conversely, the protec-
tive standards of existing legislation suggest that, as far as the general
public is concerned, our policy is to be highly risk averse.8" Indeed, the
tendency to focus more on the severity of the possible consequence than
on the relative likelihood of its occurrence is strong.8 2 This may be
simply because catastrophe is more easily understood than is incremen-
tal risk. However, it is hardly irrational to fear and to protect against
catastrophic injury.
ment, Energy, and Natural Resources and the Subcommittee on Legislation and National Se-
curity of the House Committee on Government Operations 5-6 (Feb. 1, 1994) (transcript on file
with the author).
76. For suggestiins on how better to address uncertainty in risk assessment, see Applegate,
supra note 42, at 231-35 (arguing that CERCLA has created a misallocation of resources and
suggesting reform); Latin, supra note 28, at 134-48 (recommending that social policy criteria
influence agency choices in risk assessment); Lyndon, supra note 35, at 1841-61 (suggesting
improvements in data collection and recommending a national data system to reduce uncertain-
ties); Symposium, Setting Environmental Priorities: The Debate About Risk, EPA J., Mar.-
Apr. 1991, at 17 [hereinafter Setting Environmental Priorities]; Finkel, supra note 75, at 6
(recommending that agencies focus on what actions would best address the causes of risks in-
stead of determining which risks are the worst).
77. See J. Christopher Noah, Environmental Ethics and the Future Use of Weapons Fa-
cilities, 1994 FED. FACILITIES ENVTL. L.J. 349, 352 (stating that "since environmental values
are subjective, they cannot be prioritized by humans"); Raymond Loehr, What Raised the Is-
sue?, EPA J., Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 6, 8 (stating that "without more and better data, conclusions
about relative risks will be tenuous and will depend in large measure on professional
judgment").
78. See RISK PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, at E.2 ("Programs should set priorities in manag-
ing risks."); Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of
Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 587-92 (1992) (stating that because indi-
viduals confront risks in different ways, there is a need for theoretical guidance).
79. See CALIFORNIA COMPARATIVE RISK PROJECT, supra note 63, at 14; Should We Set
Priorities Based on Risk Analysis?, supra note 71, at 19 (section by Jonathan Lash).
80. See CALIFORNIA COMPARATIVE RISK PROJECT, supra note 63, at 34.
81. See Hornstein, supra note 78, at 592-604 (noting that by emphasizing aggregate risk,
comparative risk assessment ignores distribution of risks and specially affected subpopulations).
82. See Terry Davies, Remarks at the Conference on Environmental Risk Assessment,
Politics, and Policymaking (Nov. 3, 1994) [hereinafter Davies Speech].
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The technical problem with risk-based priorities is that no good
methodology exists for comparing different types of risk.8" For exam-
ple, the simple choice of a road-paving material implicates the compar-
ison of many disparate risks: the relative safety to drivers as compared
with other surfaces that are more slippery or that contrast less well
with lane markings, fumes from the material that are toxic to workers,
fumes that are toxic to drivers, risk of accidents to workers resulting
from materials that need frequent replacement, and lesser risks to the
environment from materials that include recycled components. Assum-
ing that trade-offs are necessary, which risks should be encountered
and which should be avoided? Similarly, it is hard to see how one
could compare, in a single, objectively verifiable, "scientific" way, risks
as disparate as cancer caused by an industrial chemical, traffic acci-
dents, destruction of an ecosystem, workplace accidents, birth defects,
and AIDS. I will not belabor the enormous technical and conceptual
difficulties of comparing risks,8 other than to point out that those who
have actually attempted thorough and systematic comparisons of risks
have expressly disclaimed any strictly scientific or objective' methodol-
ogy for making such comparisons.8 5
B. Nonrisk Criteria
The foregoing considerations are not fatal to risk-based priority set-
ting, but they do mean that we must be modest in our expectations for
its accuracy8 6 and that we must look to other considerations as well.87
83. See generally Ellen K. Silbergeld, The Risks of Comparing Risks, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 405 (1995) (arguing that conducting reliable comparative risk assessments is virtually
impossible).
84. For discussions of the difficulties of comparing risks, see Hornstein, supra note 78;
Setting Environmental Priorities, supra note 76, at 17-39.
85. Actual efforts to compare risks also speak of the difficulties of the enterprise. For ex-
amples of efforts to compare risks, see CALIFORNIA COMPARATIVE RISK PROJECT, supra note
63; EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BD., REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1990); ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, UNFINISHED
BUSINESS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (1987) [hereinafter
UNFINISHED BUSINESS].
86. Cf. California v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that, although
the comparison would not be perfect, the Secretary of the Interior was required to compare
effects on fisheries in different regions).
87. See RISK PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, at E.2 (noting that risk assessors should take into
account different kinds of risks, the feasibility of reducing or avoiding risks, quality of life,
environmental justice, and risk distribution); NAS RED BOOK, supra note 17, at 49 ("Risk
assessment is only one aspect of the process of regulatory control of hazardous substances.");
Richard A. Merrill, Federal Regulation of Cancer-Causing Chemicals, in ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES: RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 1982, at 21 (1982)
(stating that because of the limitations on risk assessment, risk estimates are only one considera-
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The criteria other than risk that are relevant to priority setting can be
divided into two groups: public values and administrative concerns.
With respect to public values, Ken Jones has observed:
[A] value-free analysis tends to be irrelevant to the policy discussion.
Simply comparing the cancer risk from radon in your home, with the
risk from atrazine in your water, with the risk of dioxin from a pulp
mill, has never been sufficient to make a decision regarding the devel-
opment of a specific policy. Furthermore, comparative risk projects
typically go beyond specific policy decisions to broader policy arenas
and those broader project goals make one-dimensional comparisons
even less useful. How is it possible to exclude the discussion of values
when setting general policy in a world of environmental risks that
includes lead poisoning in children, global climate change, fragmen-
tation of habitat, or the redevelopment of urban industrial sites?88
One has only to look at the text of federal environmental statutes to
confirm that human health risk is not the only goal that they serve and
that, by and large, the statutes do not exclude nonrisk considerations in
setting standards. CERCLA, for example, requires remedial actions to
be "protective of human health and the environment,"89 as does virtu-
ally every other major environmental statute. Ecosystem damage is not
only an entirely different type of risk than human health risk, but it
also implicates other important values on its own terms, either from a
respect for nature or for pure uniqueness.
Take, for example, the saguaro cactus of Arizona. This giant,
vaguely anthropomorphic archetype of American cacti is threatened by
its own popularity-people want it in their backyards and are willing
to pay good money for it. Saguaro cacti, therefore, have a readily de-
terminable market value. Saguaro National Monument, near Tucson,
consists of rugged, arid valleys of saguaros stretching as far as the eye
can see. It would be a simple matter to estimate the number of cacti in
the Saguaro National Monument to come up with a fair market value
for them. Of course, such an exercise would be meaningless, even silly.
tion); Silbergeld, supra note 83, at 418-23; Goldstein, supra note 44, at 38 (stating that risk
management should be considered as a useful approximation of risk, not as the sole criterion for
setting risk levels).
If C6ngress wishes to emphasize the primacy of risk, that could be done simply. The Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (1988), Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011,
1044-47 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (distinguishing "comparison" and "consideration" factors), and the
National Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f) (1994) (distinguishing threshold, balanc-
ing, and modifying factors), all contain examples of hierarchies of factors in which some are
more important than others.
88. Ken Jones, Comparative Risk: How It Really Works, INSIDE EPA's RISK POL'Y
REP., Feb. 21, 1995, at 36, 37.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
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The breathtaking number of saguaros collected in one place of striking
beauty gives the Monument's cacti a value that is beyond price.
Whether or not we can discern some long-term, tangible, human bene-
fit from natural resources and ecosystems, their protection is firmly
embedded in our environmental law, and I would be very surprised if
the American people were prepared to retreat substantially from that
commitment.
Similarly, cultural and historical values may inform our understand-
ing of what is "worst" in a given situation. At the Department of En-
ergy's Hanford site in eastern Washington State, contamination of the
soil and groundwater put Native Americans at risk from their religious
use of parts of the site. The historical lack of concern for Native Amer-
ican traditions and current cultural concerns would fully justify plac-
ing restoration of such areas relatively high on a list of priorities.90
Even if they are not a dominant factor, the relatively amorphous con-
cerns of quality of life and public anxiety also ought to be considered.91
Emotional distress is often the major item of damages in a toxic tort
suit,92 and anxiety may be the day-to-day effect of unremedied envi-
ronmental risks.
Likewise, culpability is relevant to the priority of a particular activ-
ity. Using the Department of Energy as an example, the fundamental
wrongness of a secretive and unaccountable government agency's
poisoning the environment and putting at risk the health of the people
whom it was supposed to serve creates a moral imperative for remedial
action that is not captured by risk assessment alone. Indeed, Congress'
enormous financial commitment to environmental restoration at federal
facilities reflects precisely this sense of outrage, wholly apart from rela-
tive risk."'
Perhaps the most important value that is likely to be encountered is
equity, or the distribution of risks. As the environmental justice move-
ment has made clear, risks are not distributed evenly across the popu-
lation. Wealth, race, neighborhood, advanced age, and infancy can all
90. Tribal concerns at Hanford are eloquently described in CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF
THE UMATILLA INDIAN RESERVATION, SCOPING REPORT: NUCLEAR RISKS IN TRIBAL COM-
MUNITIES (1995).
91. See CALIFORNIA COMPARATIVE RISK PROJECT, supra note 63, at 33-36 (examining
the impact of environmental problems on "social welfare"); see also David L. Markell, States as
Innovators: It's Time for a New Look to Our "Laboratories of Democracy" in the Effort to
Improve Our Approach to Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV. 347, 379 (1994) (noting
that public interest per se is one of the state's priority-setting criteria).
92. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1202 (6th Cir. 1988)
(awarding damages for post-traumatic stress disorder and emotional suffering).
93. E.g., Federal Facilities Compliance Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 6961(b) (1988 & Supp.
V 1993).
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make significant differences in susceptibility and exposure. We cannot
completely characterize health risks for priorities or standard setting
without accounting for specially impacted subpopulations, "hot spots"
of multiple exposure, highly exposed persons,94 or even identifiable in-
dividuals. 95 Distribution may be unequal across time as well-what
we put off today, we impose on our children-so that intergenerational
equity must be a concern.96 Intergenerational responsibility creates a
moral mandate to address problems that are modest now, but that will
worsen significantly over time.
Turning to administrative criteria, Adam Finkel has observed that
the issue is not which risks to address first, but which actions to take
first.97 From that perspective, a thoughtful decision-maker would con-
sider cost-effectiveness and a variety of administrative issues, in addi-
tion to risk. If most of the needed information is either available or
easily obtainable, there is every reason to move forward without delay,
because resources need not be diverted to further study and assess-
ment. 98 By the same token, there is little reason to defer, on risk
grounds, actions that are inexpensive in absolute terms or that can be
implemented with minimal disruption.99 The tractability of a prob-
lem1"' and the administrability of the remedy1 1 also ought to be
94. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 74, at 63 (criticizing the De-
partment of Energy's assessment plan, because it failed to consider multiple contaminants or to
identify the "most exposed individual"); Hornstein, supra note 78, at 592-95 (criticizing "hard"
risk assessments that only evaluate how many people will suffer).
95. See Davies Speech, supra note 82.
96. EDITH B. WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW,
COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 5-45 (1989) (describing the planet
as a "global commons" shared by all generations and contending that the law should reflect this
viewpoint); Noah, supra note 77, at 352 ("[E]nvironmental destruction could be eliminating
some currently unknown but future economic asset.").
97. See Finkel, supra note 75, at 6 (" '[W]hat actions should we take right away?' is the
practical question we need to ask in a time of resource constraints.").
98. See Bartman, supra note 41, at 115-20.
99. O'Brien, supra note 63, at 99-100 (positing that society needs to consider the "essen-
tiality of products, product specifications, and public programs that are environmentally
degrading").
100. See Noah, supra note 77, at 352 ("[Institutional problems associated with managing
the environment are much more intractable than scientific and technological problems."); Adam
Finkel, Do We Know Enough to Take a Risk-Based Approach?, EPA J., Mar.-Apr. 1991, at
38, 38 ("[T]he most sophisticated ranking of risks and benefits will be a vain exercise unless
EPA is committed to controlling even the small risks when the solution is cheap or economically
beneficial and dedicated to searching for new ways to ameliorate what seem to be large but
intractable risks.").
101. Mark E. Shere, The Myth of Meaningful Environmental Risk Assessment, 19
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 409, 478-79 (1995); see also Merrill, supra note 87, at 114-17 ("Agen-
cies should not shrink from contested proceedings when health risks are high, but they should
consider their ability to enforce any formal limit they set.").
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considered.
In most situations, it would make the most sense to address risks
that can be significantly mitigated within a reasonable period of time.
This imparts an important sense of accomplishment, and it relieves the
need for further attention to the problem. Risk assessments aside, one
should be loath to commit to a lengthy, quixotic environmental restora-
tion effort."'0 Finally, an environmental regulator should always be on
the lookout for fundamental changes in processes or products that
would remedy several environmental problems at once or that would
anticipate and prevent problems, even if conventional risk assessment
suggests a low-ranking risk.*''
The interplay of risk and nonrisk considerations can be seen in the
recommendations of the Fernald Citizens Task Force regarding the
plume of contaminated groundwater extending from the Fernald prop-
erty. The Great Miami Aquifer is a major source of drinking water in
southwestern Ohio, and activism at Fernald was born when the news
broke that drinking water wells were contaminated with uranium. The
immediate groundwater risk was avoided relatively easily by providing
bottled water to residents and, ultimately, by installing water lines.
Nevertheless, the contamination of the aquifer remains the single
greatest source of concern to Fernald's neighbors, for several good rea-
sons. First, contamination of groundwater goes to the heart of people's
sense of well-being. It is nourishment, and it comes into intimate con-
tact with the body."0 Access to potable groundwater is considered an
integral part of land ownership.
Second, this huge aquifer is a major natural resource of the State of
102. See generally Mary R. English, Can Risk Assessment and Risk Prioritization Be
Extricated from Risk Management?, in RISK ASSESSMENT IN SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES
495, 495-500 (1989) (noting that because uncertainty and inequity cause difficult problems in
risk assessments, they should be a part of risk priority-setting and management choices).
103. See Hornstein, supra note 64, at 405-06 (articulating a "cause-oriented approach" to
environmental law reform that would focus on incentives to cause environmental problems and
the role that disincentives could play in solving them); Goldstein, supra note 44, at 23 ("While
continuing to emphasize risk assessment as a means to prioritize the approach to existing
problems, EPA needs to assign a high level of priority to the much more cost-effective approach
of anticipating and preventing new environmental problems."); NAPA, supra note 36, at 29
(prevention); Thomas Eisner et al., Building a Scientifically Sound Policy for Protecting Endan-
gered Species, 268 SCIENCE 1231, 1232 (1995).
104. The Delaney Clause of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act bans any carcino-
gens in food additives and cosmetics, which share the characteristics of nourishment and inti-
mate use, thereby explaining the persistence of the Delaney Clause in its present, zero-risk
form. See 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1988). For a thoughtful exposition of the view that the
Delaney Clause is unworkable and unwise in its current form, see Richard A. Merrill, FDA's
Implementation of the Delaney Clause: Repudiation of Congressional Choice or Reasoned Ad-
aptation to Scientific Progress?, 5 YALE J. ON. REG. 1, 1-88 (1988).
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Ohio. Natural resources qua natural resources are valuable in them-
selves and, indeed, resist valuation. 05 While a single instance of con-
tamination may not, in itself, destroy the resource, the multiplication of
insults surely will. Any serious conception of stewardship of natural
resources demands a response.10 6
Third, to do nothing to remediate the contamination is to leave a far
bigger problem to future generations, because the uranium plume will
spread over time.'07 Thomas Paine said, in a different context: "Every
age and generation must be as free to act for itself, in all cases, as the
ages and generation which preceded it. The vanity and presumption of
governing beyond the grave is the most ridiculous and insolent of all
tyrannies."' 08 For people who have lived in the Fernald area for gen-
erations, this obligation to the future is by no means hypothetical.
Yet the Task Force did not recommend that the aquifer be cleaned
up to the original background (naturally occurring) level of uranium,
but instead adopted a middle-ground position (approximately 10-5 ex-
cess cancer risk). The long-term risks and costs of doing nothing were
evaluated and were found to be unacceptable. However, the maximum
clean-up was considered to be of questionable technological feasibility
in view of the extremely low concentrations of uranium that would be
involved. The maximum clean-up was also viewed as unmanageable,
because it would require pumping and treating of the plume for sev-
eral decades. Choosing a remedy that could be completed in the fore-
seeable future and within the useful life of a single treatment plant
was preferable. The middle ground recommendation was a good and a
stable one. It realistically weighed a variety of risk and nonrisk factors,
including values and administrability. By working with the public to
reach this decision, the Department of Energy and its regulators
achieved substantial risk reduction at reasonable cost. They also won
the support of their stakeholders, making it easier to reach consensus
105. However, CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988), attempted to value natural
resources damages. These damages have been hotly contested. See Ohio v. Department of Inte-
rior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
106. The idea of stewardship is reflected in the public trust doctrine, which had some
currency in the 1970s, but apart from the natural resources damages provisions of CERCLA,
has been quiescent recently. For an informative discussion of the public trust doctrine, see EN-
VIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW AND SOCIETY 365-412 (Zygmunt J.B. Plater
et al. eds., 1992).
107. See Noah, supra note 77, at 352 ("[W]e must maintain ecosystem unity to maintain
humanity in the long run."). See generally WEISS, supra note 96, at 5-45 (describing the planet
as a "global commons" shared by all generations and contending that the law should reflect this
viewpoint).
108. THOMAS PAINE, Rights of Man, in COMMON SENSE AND OTHER POLITICAL WRIT-
INGS 73, 76 (Nelson F. Adkins ed., 1953).
19951 1665
HeinOnline  -- 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1665 1994-1995
1666 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63
on other issues.
C. Public Involvement
The risk assessment bills provide no more public input into priority
setting than they do for risk assessment. This is an unnecessary and
unwise exclusion.' 9 Studies that have compared public and expert
evaluation of risks have uniformly found striking differences between
these groups' perceptions of the seriousness of the same risks."1 These
differences highlight the importance of nonrisk considerations in prior-
ity setting. While some of the differences can be dismissed as public
misperceptions of risk,' their true significance is that the public and
the experts are looking at very different things."' (People also have
inconsistent preferences, which is a subject of economics and public
choice theory."') Since risk itself can mean many things, this is hardly
surprising. Priority setting, as much as anything that. regulators do,
expresses basic values. Risk can and should inform the expression of
those values in the allocation of resources, but as Donald Hornstein
has said, risk should not replace values." 4 Moreover, it is contrary to
our traditions to elevate the judgment of a technocratic elite above that
109. The Risk Principles include public input for setting priorities. RISK PRINCIPLES,
supra note 4, at E.3. (asserting that priority setting "should be informed by internal agency
experts and a broad range of individuals in state and local government, industry, academia, and
nongovernmental organizations, as well as the public at large"); see also BUILDING CONSENSUS,
supra note 38, at 35-37 (recommending public participation in risk assessment and risk
management).
110. In addition to the EPA studies referenced above, Justice Breyer's book documents this
phenomenon. See BREYER, supra note 60.
111. See id at 33-39 (finding that public perception about risks is often irrational); Bruce
N. Ames & Lois S. Gold, Environmental Pollution and Cancer: Some Misconceptions, in
PHANTOM RISK: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE AND THE LAW 153, 153-81 (Kenneth R. Foster et al.
eds., 1993) (documenting public misconceptions about the relationship between environmental
pollution and cancer); Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 235 SCIENCE 280, 280 (1988); Cross,
supra note 65, at 949-55 (urging a limited role for the public).
112. See James S. Freeman & Rachel D. Godsil, The Question of Risk: Incorporating
Community Perceptions into Environmental Risk Assessments, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 547
(1994).
113. See EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BD., supra note 85, at 11; Donald T. Hornstein, Para-
digms, Process and Politics: Risks and Regulatory Design, in WORST THINGS FIRST? THE
DEBATE OVER RISK-BASED NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES, supra note 63, at 147,
155 (describing a "republican moments" concept where environmental statutes are enacted not
during "normal" political periods, but during periods when the population becomes intensely
interested in environmental issues, such as Earth Day and the Love Canal episode). For a
discussion on the public choice theory and legal issues, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, LAW AND THE PUBLIC CHOICE (1991).
114. See Hornstein, supra note 78, at 587 ("[D]ecision theories need to connect the values
underlying environmental disputes with the problems presented to decisionmakers.").
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of the public at large, even in the name of efficiency or cost-effective-
ness. Values and political choices cannot be avoided in setting priori-
ties, and we cannot evade responsibility for value judgments by claim-
ing that priority setting is merely science.' 5
In the end, after full information and careful consideration, a dis-
junction may remain between the risk ranking of the public and that of
the scientists." 6 Some see mischief in this mismatch," 7 but I do not. A
democratic government must be ready to account for the public view of
risks." 8 If the public misunderstands the issues, the governmental obli-
gation is to educate and to persuade, not to ignore or to legislate irrele-
vance. It makes sense to begin with risk experts in setting priorities,
but the process should not end there: the public needs to be as much a
part of setting priorities as of setting standards. The risk assessment
bills are right to begin with health risk, but wrong to end with it.
III. LESSONS FROM THE LSAT
To anyone involved in higher education, many of the concerns about
quantitative risk assessment and comparative risk assessment have a
familiar ring. The Law School Admissions Test (LSAT), Scholastic
Aptitude Test (SAT), and other standardized tests similarly seek to
establish a metric-a "common yardstick," as one College Board pub-
lication puts it"-against which applicants can be evaluated and com-
115. See Andrews, supra note 70, at 536-37 (arguing that the most effective anticipatory
planning option would require consideration of public policy); Harold P. Green, The Role of
Congress in Risk Management, 16 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,220, 10,220 (1986) (stating that "[r]isk
management by Congress is more [a] political than a scientific ... exercise"); Hornstein, supra
note 64, at 378-79 (asserting that the "measurement of risk cannot be separated from value
judgments in risk assessment methodologies"); Hornstein, supra note 78, at 593 ("That deci-
sionmakers might plausibly reach different evaluations of environmental risks raises what I take
to be an important attribute of environmental law: it must be able to define and reflect our
values .... ); Latin, supra note 28, at 126 (noting that the perception that every step toward
"good science" is justified despite its possible effect on protection is "surely a public policy issue
rather than a purely scientific question"); NAPA, supra note 36, at 142-44; LEISS & CHOCI-
OLKO, supra note 55, at 140-44.
116. See UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 85, at 131-32; EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BD.,
supra note 85, at 12-24 (reviewing the EPA's 1987 report, UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note
85).
117. See BREYER, supra note 60, at 33-39 (finding that the public's failings and media
prominence give a very inaccurate view on risks, especially through overestimation and extrapo-
lation of unusual events); Ames & Gold, supra note 111, at 1530-79 (describing how scientific
evidence undermines eight "misconceptions" that the public has about environmental pollution
and cancer); Cross, supra note 65, at 949-55 (urging a limited role for the public).
118. Durenberger, supra note 63, at 50-51 (arguing that risk assessment may be valuable,
but that it is no substitute for attention to the public's values).
119. See ROBERT G. CAMERON, THE COMMON YARDSTICK: A CASE FOR THE SAT
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pared.' 2 0 Many regard such quantification with suspicion, and not
without some justification: quantifying a nonnumerical quality like
"aptitude" is an oversimplification that excludes other aspects of the
individual. Moreover, numbers have a persuasive power, perceived
precision, and resultant authority that can obscure underlying uncer-
tainty or variation. On the other hand, quantification survives and even
thrives. The LSAT can be used both as an "indicator of certain mental
abilities related to academic performance in law school" and as a tool
for comparing and ranking students. 2 1 Especially in combination with
the undergraduate grade point average, the LSAT correlates with suc-
cess in the first year of law school. 122 While this is not the onlyendpoint one might choose, 123 it is at least relevant to admissions deci-
sions. The standardized test is an efficient and readily understandable
means of expressing certain ideas or concepts. More importantly, it
provides a uniform standard for the core task of selecting among highly
diverse individuals, which itself provides a kind of equity. 24 I do not
want to overstate the analogy to risk assessment or to comment on the
underlying question of the validity of standardized testing. 125 Never-
theless, some familiar principles for the proper management of LSAT
scores might tell us something about the proper use of risk assessment.
(1989).
120. On the use of the LSAT generally, see George L. Dawson, The Law School Admis-
sions Test Battery: A Different Selection Concept for the 1980's and Beyond, 34 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 388 (1984); Thomas 0. White, LSAT/LSAS: A Brief History, 34 J. LEGAL EDuc. 369
(1984).
121. LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL/LAW SCH. ADMISSIONS SERVS., LAW SCHOOL AD-
MISSION REFERENCE MANUAL 3.3-3.5 (1993) [hereinafter REFERENCE MANUAL].
122. Id. at 3.4-3.5. Law School Admissions Services (LSAS) considers nonadmissions use
(for example, employment use) to be inappropriate. Id. at A.2. Appendix A of the Reference
Manual is also published as a separate pamphlet. LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL/LAW SCH.
ADMISSIONS SERVS., CAUTIONARY POLICIES CONCERNING LSAT SCORES AND RELATED SER-
VICES (1993).
123. First-year success is used instead of law school success and success as a lawyer, be-
cause it is much more easily measurable and less confounded by other factors. There is an
analogy here to the use in the risk assessment bills of human health risk, which is only one of
several potentially relevant endpoints.
124. See REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 121, at 3.4-3.5; Jonathan Rowe, A Tale of
Two Tests: SAT v. LSAT, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 27, 1987, at 21 ("[T]he LSAT
says less about an applicant's ability than about the need of law schools to winnow mountains of
applications. It's somewhat arbitrary, but 'better than throwing them down the stairs' and se-
lecting the ones at the bottom.").
125. For examples of literature critical of standardized tests, see JAMES CROUSE & DALE
TRUSHEIM, THE CASE AGAINST THE SAT (1988); ALLAN NAIRN, THE REIGN OF ETS: THE
CORPORATION THAT MAKES UP MINDS (1980); DAVID OWEN, NONE OF THE ABOVE: BE-
HIND THE MYTH OF SCHOLASTIC APTITUDE (1985); Eulius Simien, The Law School Admis-
sion Test as a Barrier to Almost Twenty Years of Affirmative Action, 12 T. MARSHALL L.
REV. 359 (1987).
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The main lessons from the LSAT are the importance of understand-
ing its limitations and the need to use the test results in conjunction
with other measures. Without these qualifications, use of the test is
likely to be misleading. It would certainly be possible-easy, in
fact-simply to admit students to law school in rank order of LSAT
score. Clearly, no one would find such a process to be adequate; admis-
sions professionals would regard it as essentially malpractice. Even ad-
ding the undergraduate grade point average into the formula, thereby
improving prediction of first-year grades over the use of the LSAT
alone, 2 would be unduly mechanical, for reasons that parallel the
concerns about using only risk or only risk and cost to set environmen-
tal standards and priorities.'2 7
Also, there is uncertainty in the LSAT's measurement of the likeli-
hood of success in the first year of law school (although not in the
range of orders of magnitude, like risk assessment). The LSAT has a
standard deviation of approximately 3 points on a 120-180 scale.
Thus, the difference between, say, a 150 and a 152 is not statistically
significant and should not be the sole basis for making admissions deci-
sions."' This inherent uncertainty is increased in tests that are retaken
and in persons with educational disadvantages." 9 As in risk assess-
ment, this is not surprising, because the test attempts to quantify an
essentially nonnumeric quality, the likelihood of success as a law
student.13 o
Most important, a purely numerical test misses the whole person.
Struggles against adversity, work experience in positions of responsibil-
ity, volunteerism and civic-mindedness, risk-taking in course selection,
strong written recommendations, and a persuasive personal statement
are all positive indicators of success in law school and the legal profes-
sion, yet they resist any quantitative measure, and they certainly es-
cape the LSAT. A purely quantitative formula also ignores important
admissions goals other than attracting students with high academic
126. REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 121, at 3.4-3.5.
127. See Ted Sizer, What's Wrong with Standardized Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1995,
4A, at 58 (arguing that standardized tests cannot predict long-term educational success and that,
as a result, other factors must be considered).
128. REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 121, at 3.5. LSAS states that the LSAT score is
"no more than an approximate measure." Id. When comparing test takers, "[i]t is likely that
small differences in scores are due to measurement error rather than to meaningful differences
in ability." Id.
129. Id. at 3.6-3.8.
130. See Simien, supra note 125, at 380-86 ("Should [law schools] be selecting law stu-
dents on the basis of academic ability or . . . other more important factors[?]"); Steve DeMitro,
Putting the LSAT to the Test, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Dec. 27, 1991, at 2 (arguing that the
LSAT inaccurately filters out applicants to law schools).
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ability as measured by testing. 1 ' In a law school, these goals include
enrolling a class that is diverse in (among other things) ethnicity, gen-
der, age, religion, geographic background, undergraduate background,
and professional aspirations. Many, myself included, believe that a di-
verse class enriches students' legal training by exposing them to differ-
ent ideas, perspectives, and points of view." 2 Relying solely on the
LSAT would not necessarily promote, and could well frustrate, these
goals.' Similarly, when setting environmental standards and priori-
ties, one needs to account for distributional effects, moral culpability,
and equity, as well as risk. Both risk assessment and the LSAT, there-
fore, are useful only in connection with other considerations. More
broadly, the LSAT analogy serves as a reminder that environmental
concerns, like many things in life, cannot be reduced to a unidimen-
sional inquiry.
Finally, it is important to let the affected party be heard in his or
her own voice, and it is common for college and law school application
processes to encourage submission of writing samples and personal
statements. At one level, this merely recognizes the principle of proce-
dural fairness that everyone has a "right to be heard."'' At another
level, personal presentation can help to correct inaccuracies in testing
or grades and can add important information. (In the risk context, we
have seen that lay people do not necessarily conceive of risk in numeri-
cal, quantitative terms.) Most importantly, a person's own voice is es-
sential to understanding the whole person and the whole situation, in-
stead of just one facet.
Perhaps the most striking similarity between risk assessment and
standardized testing is that both their most ardent proponents and their
131. See Coleman McCarthy, LSATs: Faulty Yardstick, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 1991, at
A19 (contending that a strict application of test scores for admission decisions would fail to
account for other worthy admissions goals like diversity of students); Franklin A. Thomas,
Measures of Success Don't Come in One-Size Fits All, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1992, at B7 (argu-
ing that standardized tests in schools have often been counterproductive to students' academic
development).
132. The district court in the recent University of Texas Law School case alleging reverse
discrimination discounted the plaintiffs' evidence that their combined LSAT scores and under-
graduate grade point averages were higher than many admitted minority students, reasoning
that numerical indicators are not the only legitimate basis for admission to law school. Hop-
wood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 578 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
133. See Simien, supra note 125, at 380-86 (arguing that one of the primary reasons for
the underrepresentation of blacks in law schools is the LSAT).
134. See generally JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PsY-
CHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975) (reporting on experiments showing that people were more satis-
fied with procedures in which they could present their own cases); Henry J. Friendly, "Some
Kind of Hearing", 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975) (discussing the elements of a fair hearing
and when hearings are required).
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critics attribute enormously more power and influence to them than do
their sponsors. Proponents tout risk assessment as a scientific, objective
way to make regulatory decisions that will quell the influences of irra-
tional public pressure and ridiculously conservative assumptions and
estimates.'8 5 Likewise, standardized tests have been represented as in-
fallible and precise measures of human intellect. Critics declare both to
be either worthless or irrelevant, or both, to the matter at hand."'
The real concern, however, is not slavish devotion to risk assess-
ments or to tests, but the more subtle problem that they will have un-
due influence in making decisions. Numbers are seductive: they imply
a degree of accuracy and certainty that is often unjustified. Past over-
selling of accuracy and certainty may have contributed to this mis-
perception, despite current disclaimers.1 3 7  Moreover, numerical
descriptors tend to swamp "soft" variables of the kinds described
above." 8 It is not appropriate, in other words, to mandate a particular
formula or a single criterion for making the evaluation and ranking
decisions for which risk assessment and the LSAT are used. Numerical
measures have important uses, among them providing a starting place
for analysis. They supply some bearings and some context, and they
may indicate outliers-risks that are clearly emergencies or clearly
trivial.1" 9 For the great majority of cases to which the risk assessment
bills apply, however, judgment should be based on a broader look at all
135. See 141 Cong. Rec. S52,034-01 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1995) (statement of Senator
Murkowski) ("So often ... decisions are made on the basis of emotion . .. instead of ... being
made on sound science .... Congress needs to require agencies to use sound science, risk assess-
ment, and cost-benefit analysis in the regulatory decisionmaking process."). But see REGULA-
TORY IMPACT ANALYSIS PROJECT, INC., supra note I, at 240-47 (concluding that policy deci-
sions are unavoidable in risk assessment and recommending that they should be explicitly
addressed); John D. Graham, Do We Know Enough to Take a Risk-Based Approach?, EPA
J., Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 36, 36 (stating that "some citizens may be deluded into thinking that
comparative risk analysis is a purely scientific undertaking").
136. Examples of overselling and the reaction can be found in CROUSE & TRUSHEIM,
supra note 125, at 16-39; OWEN, supra note 125, at 33-76.
137. See CROUSE & TRUSHEIM, supra note 125, at 16-39; see also Goldstein, supra note
44, at 37 (suggesting that one reason for the preoccupation with risk assessment is.that it has
been oversold); McCloskey Speech, supra note 63, at 3 ("Because of its judgmental nature, [risk
assessment] should not be turned into a technocratic exercise that reflects a false sense of preci-
sion and scientific certainty."); Should We Set Priorities Based on Risk Analysis?, supra note
71, at 21 (section by Lawrie Mott).
138. See CALIFORNIA COMPARATIVE RISK PROJECT, supra note 63, at 15 ("Focusing on
the quantitative aspects of risk does not provide enough information on the qualitative aspects..
. ."); Simien, supra note 125, at 378 (contending that the LSAT overemphasizes academic ac-
complishment); McCarthy, supra note 131, at A19 ("[LSATs] reveal nothing about the appli-
cant's ideals, ethics, or moral values . ").
139. LSAS cautions against the use of scores, even to determine whether applicants are
clearly admissible, without further empirical verification. REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note
121, at A.l.
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of the relevant considerations.
IV. CONCLUSION: HIDDEN AGENDAS
The likelihood that some of the provisions of the risk assessment
bills will impede environmental protection is not news to many of the
sponsors of risk assessment regulation.14 They regard such conse-
quences as a desirable side-effect. The view that environmental regula-
tion is generally too stringent and rigid is a defensible one. But the use
of facially neutral risk assessment legislation as the means to effect that
result is obnoxious. If Congress is of the view that the underlying leg-
islative standards are too stringent, then Congress should change them,
explicitly and after public debate, not through obscure technical
passages in what is ostensibly a procedural reform bill."" Risk asses-
sors are frequently attacked for incorporating political values sub silen-
tio in their risk assessments through the use of highly conservative as-
sumptions; 142 using procedural regulation to effect substantive change
is no better.
The hazardous air pollutants provision of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990143 demonstrates that Congress is entirely capable
of coming to grips, in an explicit and principled way, with the kinds of
concerns that risk assessment legislation is intended to correct. Due to
the law of diminishing returns, it may not be cost-effective to remedy
the "last ten percent" of environmental risk. The last increments of
environmental protection come at a huge cost relative to the first, so
spending resources on the larger initial reductions is often more cost-
effective. '44 The underlying legislation, however, makes the choice to
140. Neither Senator J. Bennett Johnston nor Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan favors a
general retreat from environmental regulation, although both have sponsored risk assessment
regulation and no doubt believe that the existing regulation could be improved.
141. This is precisely what House Bill 1022 § 202(a)-(b) and Senate Bill 343 § 2(a)
(adding 5 U.S.C. § 623) do. Cf. NAPA, supra note 36, at 29 ("Because setting priorities will
require balancing different objectives, it is a policy exercise in which Congress must
participate.").
142. See REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS PROJECT, INC., supra note 1, at 242 (finding
that science policy decisions, mostly conservative ones, are rarely fully and fairly disclosed to the
public); Goldstein, supra note 44, at 38 (stating that "it is bad public policy to allow the man-
ager the seeming opportunity to amend the laws of nature").
143. Pub. L. No. 101-549, tit. Il1, 104 Stat. 2531 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7412
(Supp. V 1993)).
144. BREYER, supra note 60, at 11-19; see also W. Kip Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUB-
LIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 248-51 (1992); Noah, supra note 77, at 358;
STEVEN M. BLUSH & THOMAS H. HEITMAN, TRAIN WRECK ALONG THE RIVER OF MONEY:
AN EVALUATION OF THE HANFORD CLEANUP 1-47 to 1-48 (1995) (giving examples of the
costs of achieving various cleanup levels). But see Finkel, supra note 75, at 6.
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go after the last ten percent. The original section 112 of the Clean Air
Act required hazardous air pollutants to be stringently controlled, but
within a "margin of safety" determined by the Administrator of the
EPA.1 " The program became the poster child for overregulation's
causing underregulation: in nearly twenty years, only a handful of
chemicals were regulated. 14 Congress abandoned that approach in the
1990 amendments and instead adopted a two-step process, the first step
of which was to impose technology-based restrictions within a few
years that would reduce emissions approximately ninety percent; the
residual risk, the last ten percent, is to be addressed later."4 7
It is interesting to note that the 1990 amendments also implicitly set
regulatory priorities for hazardous air pollutants. Priorities can be seen
as a three-dimensional problem: the decision-maker must choose be-
tween depth (the stringency) of regulation, breadth (the number of
topics regulated), and length (the amount of time required to accom-
plish goals).""8 In essence, the amendments chose breadth over depth
and permitted additional time to reach the ultimate risk-based goal. It
would be premature to hold up the 1990 amendments as a model of
efficiency and effectiveness. Nevertheless, they are a model of Congress'
clearly identifying its goals and taking positions on the resource choices
before it. The risk assessment bills can help Congress and agencies to
make these judgments and to identify existing legislation that should be
changed, but Congress should not go further and make those decisions
through procedural elaboration.
Risk legislation has merit. Environmental regulation would benefit
from a consistent approach to characterizing and communicating risk
and from a coherent and rational approach to setting priorities. These
features of the proposed legislation would also facilitate public partici-
pation in environmental decision-making, if such participation were
provided in the bills. Other aspects of the proposed risk legislation,
however, would paralyze environmental regulation with expensive,
time-consuming, and unnecessary analysis. This is bad policy in itself
145. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1982); see Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA
(Vinyl Chloride), 824 F.2d 1146, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
146. See John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233
(1990).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)-(f) (1988); see Bradford C. Mank, What Comes After Technol-
ogy: Using an "Exception Process" to Improve Residual Risk Regulation of Hazardous Air
Pollutants, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 263 (1994).
148. A similar calculus applies to Superfund remediation. Given limited resources, one can
choose to attack different problems in depth, resulting in fewer being addressed or a longer
clean-up; or one can address several problems at once, recognizing that the clean-up will be less
thorough, at least in the short run.
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and a grossly inappropriate way to legislate a broad retreat from cur-
rent legal standards. Even taken at face value, such legislation cannot
cure uncertainty; nor can it transform all environmental issues and
choices into risk decisions. Risk is not a sufficient end in itself, but
flexible, inclusive risk legislation would make a good beginning.
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APPENDIX




1. These principles are intended to be goals for agency activities
with respect to the assessment, management, and communica-
tion of environmental, health, and safety risks. Departmental
programs should recognize that risk analysis is a tool-one of
many, but nonetheless an important tool-in the regulatory tool
kit. These principles are intended to provide a general policy
framework for evaluating and reducing risks, while recognizing
that risk analysis is an evolving process, and agencies must re-
tain sufficient flexibility to incorporate scientific advances.
2. The principles in this document are intended to be applied and
interpreted in the context of statutory policies and requirements,
and Administration priorities.
3. As stated in Executive Order No. 12866, "In setting regulatory
priorities, each agency shall consider, to the extent reasonable,
the degree and nature of the risks posed by various substances
or activities within its jurisdiction" [Section 1 (b)(4)]. Further, in
developing regulations, federal agencies should consider "...
how the action will reduce risks to public health, safety, or the
environment, as well as how the magnitude of the risk addressed
by the action relates to other risks within the jurisdiction of the
agency" [Section 4(c)(1)(D)].
4. In undertaking risk analyses, programs should establish and
maintain a clear distinction between the identification, quantifi-
cation, and characterization of risks, and the selection of meth-
ods or mechanisms for managing risks. Such a distinction, how-
ever, does not mean separation. Risk management decisions may
induce changes in human behaviors that can alter risks (i.e., re-
duce, increase, or change their character), and these linkages
must be incorporated into evaluations of the effectiveness of such
decisions.
5. The depth or extent of the analysis of the risks, benefits, and
costs associated with a decision should be commensurate with
the nature and significance of the decision.
B. Principles of Risk Assessment
1. Departmental programs should employ the best reasonable ob-
tainable information from the natural, physical, and social sci-
ences to assess risks to health, safety, and the environment.
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2. Characterizations of risks and of changes in the nature or mag-
nitude of risks should be both qualitative and quantitative-that
is, both descriptive and mathematical-consistent with available
data. The characterizations should be broad enough to inform
the range of activities to reduce risks.
3. Judgements [sic] used in developing a risk assessment, such as
assumptions, defaults, and uncertainties, should be stated explic-
itly. The rationale for these judgements [sic] and their influence
on the risk assessments should be articulated.
4. Risk assessments should encompass all appropriate hazards to
human health and the environment (such as acute and chronic
risks, including cancer and non-cancer risks). In addition to con-
sidering the full population at risk, attention should be directed
to subpopulations (including future generations) that may be
particularly susceptible to such risks and/or may be more highly
exposed.
5. Peer-review of risk assessments can ensure that the highest pro-
fessional standards are maintained. Therefore, programs should
develop procedures to maximize its use.
6. Departmental programs should strive to adopt consistent ap-
proaches to evaluating the risks posed by hazardous agents or
events.
C. Principles for Risk Management
1. In making risk management decisions with significant impact,
programs should analyze the distribution of the risks and the
benefits and costs (both direct and indirect, both quantifiable
and non-quantifiable) associated with the selection or imple-
mentation of risk management strategies. Reasonably feasible
risk management strategies including regulation, positive and
negative economic incentives, and other ways to encourage be-
havioral changes to reduce risks (e.g., information dissemina-
tion), should be evaluated. Programs should employ the best
available scientific, economic, and policy analysis, and such
analyses should include explanations of significant assumptions,
uncertainties, and the methods of data development.
2. Where programs have discretion to choose among alternative
approaches to reducing risk, they should do so in the context of
prevention programs and account for a broad range of relevant
social and economic considerations such as equity, quality of
life, individual preferences, and the magnitude and distribution
of benefits and costs (both direct and indirect, both quantifiable
and non-quantifiable).
3. Departmental programs should develop criteria and methods to
[Vol. 63
HeinOnline  -- 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1676 1994-1995
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING
evaluate the effectiveness of risk management decisions.
D. Principles for Risk Communication
1. Risk communication should involve the open, two-way exchange
of information between professionals, including both policy
makers and "experts" in relevant disciplines, and the public.
2. Risk management goals should be stated clearly, and risk assess-
ments and risk management decisions should be communicated
accurately and objectively in a meaningful manner. To maxi-
mize public understanding and participation in risk manage-
ment, programs should:
a. explain the basis for significant assumptions, data, models,
and inferences used or relied upon in the assessment or
decision;
b. describe the sources, extent, and magnitude of significant
uncertainties associated with the assessment or decision;
c. make appropriate risk comparisons, taking into account, for
example, public attitudes with respect to voluntary versus
involuntary risks; and
d. provide timely, public access to relevant supporting docu-
ments, a reasonable opportunity for public comments, and a
mechanism to incorporate public comments.
E. Principles for Priority Setting Using Risk Analysis
1. To inform priority setting, Departmental programs should seek
to compare risks, grouping them, as appropriate, into broad cat-
egories of concern (e.g., high, moderate, and low) identifying the
populations potentially at risk, and in context of uncertainty.
2. Programs should set priorities in managing risks. To set priori-
ties, programs should take into account relevant management
and social considerations such as different types of health or en-
vironmental impacts; individual preferences; the feasibility of re-
ducing or avoiding risks; quality of life; environmental justice;
and the magnitude and distribution of both short- and long-term
benefits and costs.
3. The setting of priorities should be informed by internal agency
experts and a broad range of individuals in state and local gov-
ernment, industry, academia, and nongovernmental organiza-
tions, as well as the public at large. Where possible, consensus
views should be reflected in the setting of priorities.
4. Departmental programs should attempt to coordinate risk re-
duction efforts wherever feasible and appropriate.
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